1. Introduction to Implicature

Example from Grice 1975:43

A: How is C getting on with his job?
B: Oh, quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet.

Paul Grice says (1975:43–44), “It is clear that whatever B implied, suggested, meant, etc., in this example, is distinct from what B said, which was simply that C had not been to prison yet. I wish to introduce, as terms of art, the verb implicate and the related nouns implicature (cf. implying) and implicatum (cf. what is implied).”

Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975)

Maxim of quality: Be truthful; do not say something that you believe to be false or for which you lack evidence.

Maxim of quantity: Give as much information as is needed and no more.

Maxim of relevance: Be relevant, say what is pertinent to the discussion.

Maxim of manner: Be as brief and as orderly as possible; avoid obscurity and ambiguity.

Obviously, people often do not follow these maxims. The term Grice uses to describe this situation is that the maxim is “flouted.” While Grice proposes that these maxims are (cultural) presumptions about conversation, it is important in his scheme that the maxims can be flouted, for example if someone rambles on too long, gives confusing information, asks inappropriate questions, misleads someone, etc.

One of the main things that goes on in conversation of course is the giving and eliciting of information. When that happens, the ideal is to limit the information to what is perceived to be relevant, and avoid giving confusing or misleading information, or too much information. But people violate that ideal all the time. For example, some people are very talkative and might tell you all kinds of things that you didn’t really want to know; sometimes the information is interesting, sometimes it isn’t. Beyond the giving and eliciting of information, there are many other things that go on in conversation, dialogue. Dialogue can be used to build social solidarity or distance. It can be used to comfort, to encourage, to give orders. It can be used to manipulate, mislead, or misdirect someone. One of the interesting things about implicatures is how they can be used to mislead, what we call half-truths. That is, without technically lying, someone can deliberately try to lead someone to believe something that isn’t true. Explicatures can also be used to express important and necessary truths, as in telling parables.

When it comes to the scriptures, we take them to be relevant, truthful, necessary, complete. In scripture, the main exceptions to the cooperative principle might be found sometimes in reported dialogue in a narrative. But we do see instances of implicature in the scriptures, especially in dialogue situations. Proverbs, parables and irony are all examples of implicature, i.e., saying one thing by saying something else.

An implicature is a speech act used to deliberately imply something. It is a type of what Searle calls an INDIRECT SPEECH ACT:

The simplest cases of meaning are those in which the speaker utters a sentence and means exactly and literally what he says. In such cases the speaker intends to produce a certain illocutionary effect in the hearer, and he intends to produce this effect by getting the hearer to recognize this intention in virtue of the hearer’s knowledge of the rules that govern the utterance of the
sentence. But notoriously, not all cases of meaning are this simple: In hints, insinuations, irony, and metaphor—to mention a few examples—the speaker’s utterance meaning and the sentence meaning come apart in various ways.... The cases we will be discussing are indirect speech acts, cases in which an illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another. (Searle 1975:59–60)

Gutt 2000:40, “Relevance theory calls those analytic implications which the communicator intends to convey explicatures; the contextual assumptions which he intends to convey are called implicatures. Thus the intended interpretation of an utterance consists of its explicatures and implicatures.” Footnote adds, “It should also be noted that implicatures can be contextual assumptions as well as contextual implications.”

In relevance theory, an implicature is any meaning that is derived from a text, an utterance, that was not explicitly stated. It is open-ended. “[I]mplicatures are assumptions derived from the proposition that the hearer takes the speaker to have expressed together with the context. But the hearer cannot identify the proposition that has been expressed without taking the account of the context either. In order to recover a proposition that is truth-evaluable the speaker must assign reference to referring expressions and disambiguate ambiguous expressions. And this, as we have seen, depends on the context.” (Blakemore 1992:81)

The RT use of the term implicature does not match up with Grice’s original concept. Relevance theory did not come up with the term, but it co-opted it and gave it a different meaning. Outside relevance theory, the term has one meaning; in relevance theory it has another meaning and use. I am not going to try to follow the RT use of the term, but rather follow how the term was used by Grice and others who have been influenced by him outside the RT camp, sometimes called Neo-Griceans. At the same time, I prefer to stick with Grice’s different conversational postulates rather than trying to reduce them all down to one; I retain the notion that the maxims can be flouted; and I reject counter-intuitive concepts such as semantic resemblance and direct translation.

**Top 10 Misconceptions about Implicature** (Bach 2006, emphasis added):

1. Sentences have implicatures.
2. Implicatures are inferences.
3. Implicatures can’t be entailments.
4. Gricean maxims apply only to implicatures.
5. For what is implicated to be figured out, what is said must be determined first.
6. All pragmatic implications are implicatures.
7. Implicatures are not part of the truth-conditional contents of utterances.
8. If something is meant but unsaid, it must be implicated.
9. Scalar “implicatures” are implicatures.
10. Conventional “implicatures” are implicatures.

These last two are outside our interest at present. Bach points out that implicating is not the same thing as implying, nor the same as inferring. Nor is an implicature what both the speaker and the hearer must know and understand in order for an utterance to make sense. It is not implicit information. The number of conversational implicatures in a dialogue is not open-ended nor even very great. They are deliberate and identifiable and fairly rare, if we eliminate (as we should) what Bach calls implicitures.

Unclear or non-examples of implicatures, though some of these have been used as examples:
Q: Where are you going?
A: To the store. (Implied: I am going to the store.)

Q: Did you like the concert?
A: I thought it was very good. (Implied: Yes, I thought it was very good.)

Q: Have you checked for bread in the freezer?
A: I haven’t been downstairs. (Implied: No; understood: the freezer is downstairs.)

Example from Blakemore 1992:123
Q: Did I get invited to the conference?
A: Your paper was too long. (Implied: No, your paper was too long.)

Example from Blakemore 1992:126
Q: Do you like this music?
A: I’ve never liked atonal music. (Implied: No, this music is atonal, and I’ve never liked atonal music.)

Example from Weber 2003:52
Q: Do you want a cup of coffee?
A: Coffee would keep me awake. (Implied: either Yes or No, because coffee would keep me awake.)

These are what Kent Bach (2006:28) calls implicatures, not implicatures. In other words, it seems that what a speaker is saying is only part of what the speaker meant. It is very common for utterances to be abbreviated, elided; that is, for someone to say only part of what he wants to say and leave it up to you to figure out the rest. Bach explains (2006:28),

In these cases what one means is a completion of what one says.... No particular word or phrase is being used nonliterally and there is no indirection. Both exemplify what I call conversational impliciture since part of what is meant is communicated not explicitly but implicitly.... [W]hat the speaker means is built up from what the speaker has made explicit. This is different from both figurative utterances and implicatures (and indirect speech acts generally), since the speaker builds directly on what he has made explicit. What he means is an embellished version of what he says.

Regarding his misconception #6, Bach points out (2006:26) that

Some people seem to think that anything that may be inferred from the fact that a speaker uttered a certain sentence is an implicature. Yes, such a thing is pragmatic because it is inferred not from the sentence’s content but from the fact that the speaker uttered the sentence, but that doesn’t automatically make it an implicature, contrary to what is sometimes said.

and

A speaker’s saying a certain thing might reveal information about him, such as that he craves attention, that he hates his father and loves his mother, or that he has a certain ulterior motive, but such bits of inferable information aren’t implicated unless they’re part of what he means. In general, what is meant and in particular what is implicated must be distinguished from anything else that may be inferred from the fact that the speaker make the utterance.

Compare this with relevance theory, where the meaning of a text is divided up into what is explicated and what is implicated. Regarding his misconception #8, Bach points out (2006:27) that “One very common assumption is that what a speaker means can be divided exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated.... Speaking figuratively or obliquely are two familiar ways in which what you mean can depart from the semantic content of the sentence you utter.”

Example from Bach (2006:22) of implicature: “You could say ‘John’s command of English is excellent’ to implicate, depending on the context, that John is a mediocre student, that he would make a fine translator, that he understood something he heard, or that he had no excuse for the sloppy paper he wrote.”
Usually, the examples that are given of implicatures come from a dialogue context, which makes sense, since Grice’s original conception was that of conversational implicature, often shortened now as simply “implicature.” But this sort of implicature can typically be found in a dialogue situation. It is less common—though not unheard of—in monologue discourse, and in the scriptures, examples of conversational implicature can mainly be found in reported dialogue.

Examples from scripture, Luke 7:18–23,

The men came to Jesus, they said, “John the Baptist sent us to you to ask, ‘Are you the one who was to come, or should we expect someone else?’”

He replied to the messengers, “Go back and report to John what you have seen and heard: The blind receive sight, the lame walk, those who have leprosy are cured, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the good news is preached to the poor.”

Matthew 15:25–27,

The woman came and knelt before him. “Lord, help me!” she said.

He replied, “It is not right to take the children’s bread and toss it to their dogs.”

“Yes, Lord,” she said, “but even the dogs eat the crumbs that fall from their master’s table.”

Mark 12:1–12,

[Jesus] began to speak to them in parables: “A man planted a vineyard... He rented the vineyard to some farmers.... At harvest time he sent a servant to the tenants to collect.... They seized him, beat him and sent him away empty-handed.... They took him and killed him, and threw him out of the vineyard. What then will the owner of the vineyard do? He will come and kill those tenants and give the vineyard to others....”

Then they looked for a way to arrest him because they knew he had spoken the parable against them.

Luke 10:29–37,

But he wanted to justify himself, so he asked Jesus, “And who is my neighbor?”

In reply Jesus said: “A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho when he fell into the hands of robbers....”

Luke 12:41–48,

Peter asked, “Lord, are you telling this parable to us, or to everyone?”

The Lord answered, “Who then is the faithful and wise manager, whom the master puts in charge of his servants to give them their food allowance at the proper time? It will be good for that servant whom the master finds doing so when he returns....”

Luke 13:23–30,

Someone asked him, “Lord, are only a few people going to be saved?”

He said to them, “Make every effort to enter through the narrow door, because many, I tell you, will try to enter and will not be able to. Once the owner of the house gets up and closes the door....”

Luke 17:37 (CEV),

Then Jesus’ disciples spoke up, “But where will this happen, Lord?”

Jesus said, “Where there is a corpse, there will always be vultures.”

Relevance theory owes a great debt to Grice’s notion of conversational implicature, but Sperber and Wilson claim to improve on Grice by showing how his different conversational maxims (which Grice knew could be violated) can be distilled down to one: relevance. “Grice (1975) analyses certain implicatures as arising from the violation of a maxim. In some cases, he claims, the violation can be explained by the assumption that the maxim clashes with another....” Sperber
and Wilson’s Relevance Theory has only one pragmatic principle, and hence there is no possibility of clashes.” (Blakemore 1992:132)

Before Grice, Wittgenstein had said that “meaning is use,” which was a good contribution on its own. This goes along with our understanding in linguistics and translation that the meanings of words are conventional, and not inherent in the words themselves. (This is probably a gross oversimplification.) Grice used conversational examples to show that meanings intended by a speaker, on the one hand, and the internal meanings of linguistic codes, on the other hand, are not identical. In other words, you can say something that has a certain internal meaning, but the fact that you said it in a certain context adds a new dimension of meaning that can be distinguished from the conventional meanings of the words and sentences. This is seen in common examples like “Coffee keeps me awake,” which has one meaning internally but various meanings in its use in different contexts, depending, for example, on whether the speaker wants to stay awake or wants to go to sleep. Relevance Theory builds on this observation that sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning can be two different things.

Gutt sees implicatures all over the place and equates them with communicative clues. Implicatures and implicit information are not the same thing. I define implicature more narrowly, following Grice and others like Levinson and Horn. I see an implicature as being more like figurative language, i.e., there is a disjunct between what is literally said and what is implied by saying it that way. It acknowledges that sometimes what is said is not exactly what is meant to be communicated. Most communication is fairly straightforward, though often abbreviated. Some communication indeed involves the giving and interpreting of clues. This is not the norm, however.

The way RT uses the term implicature, there are an indeterminate number of implicatures in an utterance. Grice, however, restricts implicatures to being something deliberate and identifiable.

2. A model of translation

Here is a very simple and very Saussurean1 explanation of what language is: Language is an arbitrary but conventional and shared system of signs used for the purpose of communication. Key words in this definition are “arbitrary” and “conventional.” The signs themselves have an arbitrary relationship to what they refer to, and the system (e.g. the grammar), too, is arbitrary to a great extent, though some linguists prefer to emphasize what all human languages have in common. When it comes to human languages, each language is different but all languages are the same in some important ways.

Translation is a communication between a translator and an audience where the intention is to create equivalence to a source text, i.e., a different author’s communication with a different audience, typically in a different language. A translator is someone who controls two languages or language forms in order to be able to create this equivalence. The goal of translation is to create equivalence, for the sake of a new audience, so they now have the text accessible to them and the derived text can be taken as a substitute for the original.2

A translation is a text. It is words arranged in sentences, and sentences arranged in larger structures, in a non-arbitrary way according to the conventions of language, with the purpose of communicating something in particular. The translator constructs this text with a purpose. The translator is referencing another text and aiming to produce something perceived to be equivalent in some significant way. Equivalence is hard to pin down and subjectively determined,

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1 See Saussure 1959[1915], especially chapter 3, “The Object of Linguistics,” and especially subsection 1, “Definition of Language,” but Saussure is so concerned with explaining what language and linguistics are not that he never gives a concise, positive explanation of what language is.

2 This is a variant form of the definitions of language previously given in Frank 2007 and 2008.
but it is a necessary ingredient for something to be considered a translation. The translator perceives that an original author communicated something to an original audience, and the translator aims to reproduce something from that original communication in a new context and with a new audience that was not reached by the original, source text. According to the traditional conception of translation, this new communication is in a language different from the original communication.

The purpose of translation is to bring the text to a new audience. There are different stakeholders connected to any translation, including the translator; the language community that will benefit from the translation, which itself is probably heterogeneous; the patron(s) or whoever commissioned the translation; and quite possibly others outside the target language community who have a stake in seeing that the translation is faithful to the original. The most successful translation is one in which all stakeholders believe their purposes have been accomplished. Among other things, this means that a community has an important text accessible to them now. It is now “theirs,” e.g., “their Bible.”

The CODE MODEL was invented by Sperber and Wilson (1986:2). Nobody claims to follow the code model, and to some extent it is a straw man argument. That is, nobody claims that language and communication are a matter of simple encoding and decoding where context is irrelevant. Everybody acknowledges that encoding and decoding are part of communication, but not everything, and that context and implicit information are important factors in how humans communicate. The OSTENSIVE-INFERENTIAL model that Sperber and Wilson promote emphasizes the giving and deciphering of clues, perhaps to the point of distortion, as if a text or any verbal communication were essentially a riddle.

Sperber and Wilson’s code model concept is related to—but not identical with—the CONDUIT METAPHOR, which is one of those “metaphors we live by.” Reddy (1979) points out that it has for a long time been pervasive in common, popular thinking about communication to conceptualize language as a vehicle, a conduit, for encapsulating meanings to send across to another person who will unpack these meanings from the language used. Sperber and Wilson’s conceptualization of a code model is also related to Shannon and Weaver’s INFORMATION THEORY (1949), which has its foundation in electrical engineering and particularly in communication via telephone, and where the emphasis is on how channels are used to transmit information. In fact it brings to mind the image of communicating via the Morse code over a telegraph wire. Shannon and Weaver’s transmission model is now quite dated and widely recognized as inadequate for describing normal communication, where not all exchange of thoughts takes place linearly, through a single channel, and where context is a crucial factor. In reality, meaning is not in the words, symbols, language; meaning is in people, and it may be stimulated by words, symbols, utterances. It is the conventional nature of language which, in combination with context, enables the use of language to stimulate meanings.

A note about theories. We can talk about language, communication and translation in various ways, including metaphors and images, including models, and including theories. I don’t know about the hard sciences, but in social sciences theories come and go, and anything that aspires to be a theory distorts the subject matter under investigation, emphasizing certain things and sometimes twisting the subject matter in unnatural ways. Models are more useful and tend to be more realistic. Even models per se are not absolutely necessary. The usefulness of a model is measured in terms of how well it enables something worthwhile.4

3 Note that Blackburn (2007) gives the term “code model” a different meaning and then explains it as a powerful metaphor of some value. For him, “The code model is best understood as a contemporary integration of three models: (1) the conduit metaphor, (2) Saussure’s speech circuit, and (3) modern information theory” (2007:13).

4 Grice can no longer speak for himself, but it seems his exposition about conversational maxims was not meant to be a theory. See Bach’s (2006:25) claim that “Grice did not intend his account of how implicatures are recognized as
The nature of translation is intuitive to anybody who speaks more than one language. In preparing someone to undertake an important work of translation, it may be helpful to present an intuitively-satisfying model of translation and bring to consciousness some of the associated concepts. As an appendix to this paper, I present some foundational principles of Bible translation. These Bible translation principles are easily taught because they concur with what we know intuitively about translation, but as preparation for engaging in Bible translation they may be worth bringing to consciousness.5

3. Implicatures in translation

Principle: Aim to translate implicatures as implicatures, parables as parables, proverbs as proverbs, irony as irony, metaphor as metaphor, poetry as poetry. Do not automatically explicate implicatures. Don’t unnecessarily turn the text into something other than what it is, e.g., turn a literary narrative with some inherent ambiguity into something explicit like a scientific treatise. Don’t over-explicate the text. However, judgment calls are necessary in translation, depending on the language one is translating into. While the aim should be to translate implicatures as implicatures, there are times when that might lead to misunderstanding, and the translator has to make a wise, informed decision about when it might be called for to subtly bring out something that is implicit and make it explicit, or explicate something that is only implied, but not without testing to see if a misunderstanding seems inevitable. It helps to have an understanding of where there is an implicature, and combine that understanding with a general rule of translating implicatures as implicatures.

I have no problem in a translation subtly providing a few words here and there to make something explicit that we assume to be understood, e.g., Matthew 3:13, “Then Jesus came from the region of Galilee to the Jordan River to be baptized by John.” In this case, we understand the complete name to be “Jordan River” and “Jordan” is just an abbreviated way of saying the full name. Even the King James Version did this sort of thing sometimes. One way to look at it in this case would be to say that Greek τὸν Ἰορδάνην is translated as “the River Jordan.”

Or Luke 13:18–19, “Then Jesus asked, ‘What is the kingdom of God like? What shall I compare it to? It is like a tiny mustard seed, which a man took and planted in his garden. It grew and became a tree, and the birds of the air perched in its branches.’” In this case, if people are not familiar with mustard seeds and might not fully appreciate the example of something tiny growing into something very large, it could be appropriate to subtly add a tiny modifier to draw out the

a psychological theory or even as a cognitive model. He intended it as a rational reconstruction.... He was not foolishly engaged in psychological speculation about the nature of or even the temporal sequence of the cognitive process that implements that logic.”

5 This contrasts with another approach for preparing people to engage in Bible translation where the emphasis is on giving a great deal of training to people to overcome what they might have thought they knew about translation and communication in general, done under the guise of teaching people what they should consider to be realistic to expect in terms of communication. In terms of motivation for such a re-education approach, see Gutt (2005):

The creation of realistic expectations of ‘translation’ – whatever one means by the term – is a challenge.... Due to a lack of understanding of these law-like interdependencies, people – not only the public, but also translators themselves, even translation scholars – have operated for a long time with expectations of translation that conflict with the way the human mind works.

This appears to be one of the main reasons why translation has remained a surprisingly controversial phenomenon, beset with much dissatisfaction, even after many centuries of practice and investigation. If it is true that translators, the public and scholars have operated with notions and expectations that are out of line with the cognitive realities of communication, then it is not surprising that satisfactory answers have been in short supply....

[I]n the field of translation, the way forward seems to lie in bringing the expectations of translation in line with the cognitive realities of our minds. That should free us to pursue the accomplishment of realistic and successful cross-language communication. This is no doubt a daunting task, a process of re-education that will most likely have to involve the public sector, like our education system, and take considerable time. The starting point, however, must be a recognition of the cognitive realities that determine how human communication works.
meaning. One way to look at this might be to say that κόκκῳ σινάπεως is translated as “tiny mustard seed.”

On the other hand, in Luke 7:18–23, where John the Baptist’s disciples came to Jesus asking him to make it clear whether or not he is the Messiah, Jesus significantly does not give a straight answer. He gives John’s disciples evidence from which they can infer an affirmative answer to their yes/no question, but without it being provided explicitly. It would not be appropriate in translation to turn Jesus’ implicature in this case into an explicit “yes” answer.

To translate irony, one would have to study how irony is expressed in the language one is translating into, and also test to see how an ironic statement is understood. Ideally one would translate irony as irony. Ideally one would translate a metaphor as a metaphor, though it is necessary to test a translation, and sometimes translators make a judgment that a figure of speech like a metaphor is not understood and make subtle adjustments in order to make the language comprehensible. Ideally a proverb is translated as a proverb. I don’t know of anyone seriously proposing that a parable in certain cases should be translated as anything other than a parable. It is good to keep the ideal that any implicature should be translated as an implicature, and not be converted into an explicature. Based on the resources available in the target language and culture, and based on comprehension testing, sometimes the translator might make a wise, informed judgment to translate an implicature as an explicature, but this should be the exception to the general rule, the ideal.

It is good to bear in mind the difference between implicatures, on the one hand, which are not all that common in scripture apart from familiar figurative language such as proverbs, parables and irony, and on the other hand information that the translator considers to be elided, or asyndeton. In the latter cases, different translation strategies might be appropriate.

The goal of translation is to bring a text to a new audience. So you are translating the text, not (what you perceive to be) the author’s intentions of what he wanted to communicate, nor are you translating the context. The anchor of translation is the text itself.

My view of translation is that it must be communicative. Sure, the original text is a communication between other parties, but the reason for translating it is to bring the text to a new audience. The translator cannot do everything that might be required in order to make the meaning of the text, with all its implications and presuppositions, completely transparent to the reader. On the other hand, disregarding theoretically-based statements about achieving “meaning-resemblance” or “interpretive resemblance,” the translator can’t do nothing to make the text comprehensible either. The translator has to test the translation with representatives of the target audience and then make wise, informed judgments about how to go about making it comprehensible to the target audience. The result should be that the scriptures will be theirs.
References


This paper can also be found online at: www.dbfrank.net/papers/Implications_of_Implicatures_for_Translation.pdf, possibly in a revised form.

See also the following papers by the same author:


Principles of Bible Translation, concisely stated

Languages are not all the same, but translation is possible. (Quite obvious, but still stated.)

Translation is communication. (Should be obvious, but it is good to remind.)

The grammar of one language will not be the same as another, e.g., Greek case system, free word order.

Words have ranges of meaning: a primary sense and other senses or uses.

If you use a dictionary to tell you how to translate, you might get a bad translation.

Examples of ‘run’ and ‘key’ in English and Spanish (from Bob Bascom). Also, Greek pneuma.

To translate a word, you have to look at how the word is used in context and translate it accordingly.

You might not translate a word according to its primary meaning.

You don’t just translate words—you translate sentences, stories.

You have to think about the meaning of what you are translating. Translation requires interpretation.

Qualities we look for in a translation: exatudão, clarareza, naturalidade

Problem: There is no word for what you have to translate.

What are some examples? fig tree (Matthew 21:19), winter (Matthew 24:20), lake, Pharisee (Matthew 23:29), synagogue (Mark 1:21-22), Messiah, snow (Matthew 28:3), righteousness, wineskin, etc.

Solutions:
1) use a descriptive phrase
2) use a more general or more specific word
3) borrow and transliterate a word from another language
4) use a cultural substitute (in figurative language)

Note, though, that when you transliterate, you aren’t translating.

Figurative language:

idiom  Your hearts were hard (Mark 10:5)  
simile as a grain of mustard seed (Matthew 17:20)  
metaphor the lost sheep of Israel (Matthew 10:6)  
metonymy loved the world (John 3:16)  
synecdoche the feet of those (Acts 5:9)  
irony You have become rich! (II Corinthians 4:8)  
euphemism fell asleep (Acts 13:36)  
hendiadys silver and gold (Acts 3:6)  
litotes not disobedient (Acts 26:19)  
personification sun ashamed (Isaiah 24:23)  
apostrophe O death (I Corinthians 15:55)  
hyperbole tens of thousands (I Samuel 18:7)

Grammatical adaptation: abstract nouns (Mark 1:4, I Peter 2:1; II Peter 1:5–7)  
 passive and active (Matthew 28:18; Mark 1:9, 2:5; Luke 8:5; John 1:6)  
 sentence length and word order

Rhetorical questions (Luke 11:11–12; II Corinthians 12:18)

Key Biblical terms (e.g. Son of Man, Christ/Messiah, kingdom of God, worship, evil spirit, blessing, elder, baptize, prophet, sabbath, priest, pray, sacrifice, glory, faith, grace, mercy)